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I. INTRODUCTION
In a 1991 article,' I wrote about Linda Brown and Rule 11.2
Brown, of course, was the lead plaintiff in the school desegregation
case of Brown v. Board of Education.3 Brown sought to challenge a
well-entrenched judicial doctrine, "separate but equal," that the
Supreme Court established almost sixty years earlier in Plessy v. Fer-
guson.4 Since the 1896 Plessy decision, the courts consistently had re-
affirmed their commitment to the separate but equal philosophy.5
Despite the strong authority weighing against their arguments, Brown
and her attorneys knew they could still bring the case to court and be
heard. Indeed, litigants like Linda Brown and Alan Bakke,6 who pur-
sued the then novel reverse discrimination theory, "understood [that]
they might lose because of the novelty of their claims... but they did
not have to fear the immediate threat of sanctions for trying."7
1. Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 475, 475 (1991).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 was amended in 1983 as part of a package of amend-
ments designed to curb perceived abuses of litigation and unnecessary cost and delay in
federal litigation. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECrIVES
AND PREVENIVE MEASURES § 1.01, at 1-5 to -6 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1993).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927);
Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
6. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. Vairo, supra note 1, at 476.
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However, these challenges to established authority were made
before the watershed year of 1983, during which significant amend-
ments to Rule 11 were made. In the aftermath of these amendments,
this Author suggested that the "calculus" for determining whether to
assert such challenges was changing.8 This Author concluded that
Rule 11 was forcing too many litigants, like the modem Linda Browns
or perhaps today's antiabortion protesters, to "think twice before pro-
ceeding" or to forgo litigation entirely even though important rights
may be at stake.9
The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 have now become effective
and, as Judge Schwarzer ably explains, significant changes have been
made in an attempt to improve the administration of the rule.10 But
will they work? If the proverbial Linda Brown walked into your law
office and presented her problem to you, would you take the case?
Rule 11 would still play a major role in your decision, and the Rule's
new safe harbor provision would not necessarily make the decision
any easier. The safe harbor provision might merely push back the
time frame for deciding when to bail out on the client.
Why revisit this hypothetical? The only purpose is to demon-
strate that many of the Rule's old problems remain. Many attorneys
still would not take a case like Linda Brown's for fear of sanctions.
Although the 1993 amendments are a step in the right direction, fun-
damental conceptual problems-as well as practical ones-remain
unresolved. Perhaps these fundamental conceptual problems were
glossed over too quickly in the debate over the new amendments.
Although this paper is keyed to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, the same issues and concerns arise under state law; for example,
California has been experimenting with Rule 11-like statutes over the
last decade." The most recent version of the general California sanc-
tions rule is section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was
most recently amended in January of 1993.12 It reads very much like
the 1983 version of Rule 11 but contains some limitations. For exam-
ple, a court cannot impose sanctions against plaintiffs in class action
cases.' 3 And, like the 1993 Rule 11 amendments, the California stat-
8. Id
9. Id.
10. See William W Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 7,
12-23 (1994).
11. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 447 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994) (Historical and Statu-
tory Notes).
12. Id § 447.
13. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 447 (West Supp. 1994).
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ute requires that notice and an opportunity to be heard be provided
and that a written order "recit[ing] in detail" the justification for sanc-
tions be issued.1 4 Section 447 also contains a sunset provision-the
statute will expire on January 1, 1998.15 However, the provision is in
effect only in Riverside and San Bernardino counties.16
A more limited, bad-faith rule also exists in California.'7 A trial
court may order "a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay reason-
able expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred" because of bad-
faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or intended solely to cause
unnecessary delay."8
Essentially, Rule 11 and similar state statutes dramatically change
the dynamics of the attorney-client relationship, shifting the attorney's
duty away from client advocacy toward judicial efficiency and case
management as an officer of the court. However, one issue that must
be addressed squarely is whether, in moving toward this model of
lawyering,' 9 Rule 11 may be moving lawyers too far away from the
traditional model of a legal profession independent from the state and
in close association with particular client interests.
A. The Importance of Lawyer Independence
Before addressing how Rule 11 interferes with lawyer indepen-
dence, it is crucial to understand why lawyer independence is impor-
tant. Independence is not important simply because it is a "good deal
for lawyers" to regulate themselves and control their own lives;20 law-
yer independence must promote some public good. Two justifications
are frequently given for an independent legal profession: ensuring the
separation of powers and guarding the framework of democracy.
21
The separation of powers argument can be quickly dismissed in
the case of Rule 11. According to this argument, regulation of the bar
should fall exclusively within the province of the judiciary because
lawyers principally function within the court system. Therefore, legis-
lative interference with lawyer regulation would usurp judicial power




17. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982).
18. Id.
19. Judge Schwarzer supports this model. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 32-37.
20. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988).
21. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. Rav. 799,
854-55 (1992).
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ent branches of government. Rule 11, however, gives the judicial
branch sole power to regulate lawyers through sanctions. 2
Rather, it is Rule 11's potential effects on lawyer independence
from the perspective of democratic theory-what Robert Gordon
calls "the ideal of liberal advocacy"3-that should concern us. The
ideal of liberal advocacy promotes an independent bar as the only way
to ensure a democratic government.24 "Only an independent legal
profession can adequately protect the rights of individuals against
state power."'  It is this function, "the vindication of individual
rights" 6 vis-a-vis the state, that necessitates lawyers' need to be able
to "assert and pursue client interests free of external controls."27
Thus, lawyers must remain free and independent from "all potentially
corrupting influences that might cloud or distort their considered as-
sessments of what legality requires."'  Failure to remain independent
from external state control results in significant societal costs and en-
dangers individual liberties. The extreme embodiment of such a fail-
ure can be seen in the legal system of Nazi Germany.
In Nazi Germany the law became an instrument of fascist policy,
and both judges and the legal profession obligingly assisted in its im-
plementation. Indeed, the legal profession's abject failure to chal-
lenge the Third Reich was partly responsible for the Nazi regime's
success.29 As Udo Reifner writes, the German judicial system-both
its personnel and structure-legitimized state terrorism, giving Nazi
racist policies "a seemingly rational image and making murderous in-
tentions legally realizable."3 With the German bar's assistance, the
Nazis were able "to abolish the limitations imposed by the legal order
on their power by denying the individual and collective rights of those
who opposed their political and military aims."31
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
23. Gordon, supra note 20, at 10.
24. Id.
25. Wilkins, supra note 21, at 859.
26. Gordon, supra note 20, at 10.
27. Id.
28. Wilkins, supra note 21, at 863.
29. Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 COLUM. L. REv.
1807, 1809 (1993) (reviewing INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE
TnRD REicH (1991)).
30. Udo Reifner, The Bar in the Third Reich: Anti-Semitism and the Decline of Liberal
Advocacy, 32 McGiLL L.J. 96, 104 (1986).
31. Id. at 99.
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To accomplish this goal, the attorney's role was changed from in-
dependent advocate to officer of the state.32 "The attorney's right to
information was no longer seen as a right to be exercised on his cli-
ent's behalf but rather as part of his role as an 'officer of the court'
and therefore only to be exercised in the interest of the State."33 At-
torneys accepted this integration into the Nazi system even to the
point of demanding, in at least one case, the death sentence for their
own clients.34 Lawyers watched as the Nazi government "effectively
abolished any procedural rights which had been designed to protect
citizens from arbitrary political or social power. '35 The lawyer was
considered to be under the judge's command, not the client's, and if
the lawyer did not comply voluntarily, sanctions ranged from ethical
rebuke to torture. -Actions were instituted against legal professionals
for invoking their clients' rights, 36 for criticizing the rulings of
judges,37 and for challenging state practices or laws.3"
One might wonder why lawyers would have gone along with such
repressive measures. In large part economic and politically based
anti-Semitism led to the expulsion of Jews from the German legal pro-
fession and encouraged the remaining lawyers to become tools of the
state.39 While the German bar was generally perceived as dedicated
to defending individual rights, Jewish lawyers, at least arguably, domi-
nated the segment of the profession actually working to protect indi-
vidual- rights.40 Jewish lawyers were especially noted for their
particular liberalism,4' and were thus an obvious target for the Nazi
regime.
In the guise of redressing the economic problems of the legal pro-
fession, the Nazi government enacted a number of laws that effec-
32. See id. at 99, 107-10.
33. Id. at 113 (quoting 29 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES EHRENGERICHTSHOFS [DECISIONS OF
THE COURT OF ETHics] 28, 112 n.59 (1935)).
34. Id. at 120.
35. Id. at 111.
36. Id. at 113.
37. Id. at 112.
38. Id. at 112-13.
39. See id. at 99, 107-10.
40. Id. at 104-07.
41. Id. at 106.
Jewish lawyers were generally active in areas where reactionary, militarist and
feudal tendencies were challenged. In this sense the Nazi slogan of a "Jewish
Conspiracy" was a reflection of fact: the political right itself had inspired strong
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tively eliminated Jewish and women lawyers from the profession and
made the use of lawyers compulsory in actions where their use had
not previously been required, for example, small claims court.42 Thus,
economically distressed individuals who could not afford representa-
tion were denied access, and the lawyers who had previously repre-
sented them were eliminated.43 In contrast lawyers who represented
business interests were provided more economic freedom.
4
As a historical footnote, in 1947 the United States Supreme Court
decided Hickman v. Taylor,45 which advanced a broad work-product
privilege for attorneys. Justice Murphy's opinion was based on the
conception that although an attorney is an officer of the court, an at-
torney must "faithfully [protect] the rightful interests of his clients."
4 6
Accordingly, there exists a "general policy against invading the pri-
vacy of an attorney's course of preparation [that] is so well recognized
and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal
procedure."4 7
Justice Jackson concurred but went even further. He wrote of the
need and importance of protecting the legal profession, stating:
But it too often is overlooked that the lawyer and the law
office are indispensable parts of our administration of justice.
Law-abiding people can go nowhere else to learn the ever
changing and constantly multiplying rules by which they
must behave and to obtain redress for their wrongs. The
welfare and tone of the legal profession is therefore of prime
consequence to society, which would feel the consequences
48
Justice Jackson objected to the disclosure of work product be-
cause it ultimately could turn a lawyer into a witness against his or her
client's interests. While we can only speculate, perhaps it was the
experience of Nazi Germany that motivated his opinion. Justice Jack-
son served as the American Chief of Prosecution during the Nurem-
42. Id. at 116-19.
43. Id. at 117.
44. Id. at 114-20. Judge Schwarzer has noted the "unprecedented competitiveness"
facing American lawyers in the eighties. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 8. Such
problems have not abated significantly and one hopes that American lawyers would not
subscribe to discriminatory tactics to preserve their economic welfare.
45. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
46. Id. at 510.
47. Id. at 512.
48. Id. at 514-15 (Jackson, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 516-17 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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berg trials in the year before Hickman v. Taylor was decided. Perhaps
learning about what happened to the German legal profession, and
what happened when it became an arm of the state, reminded Justice
Jackson of the supreme importance of an independent legal
profession.
This is not to suggest that Rule 11 is the first step toward Nazism.
However, several parallels do exist between the experience of the
German bar under the Nazis and our legal profession's experience
under Rule 11. In both cases the legal profession's independence is
compromised and individual rights are not vindicated. Just as oppo-
nents or supposed "enemies" of the Nazi state found, some citizens
under our system-the modemday Linda Browns-and their attor-
neys are finding that they are unable to be heard in our courts without
the fear of reprisal.
Moreover, as Judge Schwarzer demonstrates, the purpose of the
Rule 11 amendments-and Rule 26's new disclosure rules 5-0-is, in
essence, to split the lawyer's duty between the needs of the client and
those of the legal system.5 1 Lawyers are to be concerned, along with
judges, about speeding up the queue. Thus, they are essentially being
asked to bail out on their clients sooner rather than later and to worry
about their responsibility to the court as much as the interests of the
client. As a result there is the potential for the judicial system to co-
,opt lawyers to the detriment of their clients' interests.
We should not accept the argument that Lord Brougham's5 2 and
Lon Fuller's ideals-that a lawyer's duty is first and only to the cli-
ent 53-are out of date or too costly in modern society. As Fuller put
it, a lawyer's arguments should be presented with "partisan zeal....
His task is not to decide but to persuade. '54 "[A lawyer] plays an
important role in the process of social decision."55 "The central and
recurring theme in our profession's narratives portrays lawyers as
champion, defending the client's life and liberty against the govern-
ment... ."I' Efficiency concerns cannot override social concerns.
50. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 12-13.
51. See id.
52. 2 Proceedings in the House of Lords, Trial of Queen Caroline 5 (Duncan Stevenson
& Co. ed., 1820).
53. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 35-36
(Harold J. Berman ed., 1971).
54. Id. at 35.
55. Id. at 41.
56. Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389,
1448 (1992).
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B. How Rule 11 Interferes with Lawyer Independence
Judge Schwarzer's presentation illuminates some of the thinking
underlying the most recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, including Rule 11, and raises some interesting and provoc-
ative questions. It is hard to argue with many of his basic points. For
example, it sounds "Mom & Pop and apple pie" to argue that lawyers
should act more responsibly to the court and should not continue to
press a position once it ceases to have any merit, and that Rule 11
ought to be used to enhance lawyers' professional responsibility.
To the extent that the recent amendments to Rule 11 are
designed to control the bad lawyer conduct that has generated public
disdain for the legal profession, they seem important and justifiable.
Such regulation should come with little or no cost because the Rule
will be primarily conduct regulating, as opposed to content regulating.
Thus, the intent is to silence the critics of Rule 11 who argue that its
existence and application has created the so-called chilling effect.
This Author finds herself in general agreement with much of what
Judge Schwarzer has presented. In fact, there is little doubt that if
judges focused on egregious conduct instead of content when inter-
preting Rule 11, many of the problems associated with the Rule would
abate. The problem, however, is that Rule 11, as amended, may not
be interpreted in the way Judge Schwarzer suggests or in the way the
Advisory Committee intends. Moreover, this Author has important
disagreements with Judge Schwarzer over some of his basic premises.
In the first place, Judge Schwarzer's presentation begs an impor-
tant question. Implicit in his argument is the premise that courts are a
" 'societal resource, not merely the private playpen of the litigants,'"
and therefore we must undertake the difficult task of discouraging
hyperactivity.5 7 Another important premise that has gone unchal-
lenged is that lawyers owe an important duty to the court.
There are two problems here. First, we ought to question what it
means to say that courts are a societal resource and whether it is a
good thing to reorient lawyers to act more as officers of the court. Of
course courts are a societal resource; they are publicly funded and
much of the adjudication process is within the public domain. But
who uses the courts? Often it is individuals with complaints against
the government or a larger economic entity. These individuals' right
57. Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 17 (quoting Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System:
Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19 (1984)). This premise is attributed to Arthur
Miller, the architect of the 1983 version of Rule 11.
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to invoke the judicial process ought not to be impeded because of
someone's concerns about "hyperactivity."58
As Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote, "To enforce one's rights
when they are violated is never a legal wrong, and may often be a
moral duty."5 9 Judge Cardozo continued: "A great jurist, Rudolf von
Jhering, in his Struggle for Law, ascribes the development of law itself
to the persistence in human nature of the impulse to resent aggression
.... 60 Rudolf von Jhering, a great pre-World War I German jurist,
developed the notion of rechtsgefuhl,61 which Judge Joseph M. Mc-
Laughlin has translated as "a feeling of legal right, but implying the
pain and irritation a person feels when he has been put upon."62
It is somewhat ironic to refer to a German jurist to recommend a
loose interpretation of Rule 11 so as to" prevent the Rule's chilling
effect. Germany has shown us the horrors that can occur when the
legal profession loses its independence and lawyers turn their backs
on clients rather than seek to vindicate their rights. Sanctions may be
appropriate when lawyers engage in wrongdoing. The process of win-
ning and losing, however, takes ample care of the wrongheaded. 63
In our society lawyers have played an important role in securing
the rights inherent in the Constitution and federal law. At the state
level, lawyers have pushed the boundaries of common law. In the
sanctions climate that exists today, would an attorney feel free to push
a novel "enterprise liability theory" like that ultimately approved by
the California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories?64
Without lawyers, how well would Linda Brown, of Brown v. Board of
Education,6" have fared? If Thurgood Marshall and his comrades had
been concerned about their role as officers of the court via Rule 11,
would they, or more importantly, could they have afforded to press so
hard in the face of Plessy v. Ferguson?66 Many will reply that the
Brown decision would not have been different,67 that Thurgood Mar-
58. Id.
59. Morningstar v. Lafayette Hotel Co., 105 N.E. 656, 657 (N.Y. 1914).
60. Id.
61. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 21-31 (John J. Lalor trans., 2d
ed. 1915) (describing life of law as struggle).
62. Hon. Joseph M. McLaughlin, The Unification of Germany: What Would Jhering
Say?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 277, 278 (1994).
63. See VAIRO, supra note 2, app. H at H-18.
64. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
67. Judge Schwarzer argues, for example, that the law had begun to evolve almost 15
years before Brown was decided. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 35. He may, therefore,
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shall would not, and should not, have feared Rule 11. It is easy to say
that in 1994. But was it so easy an argument fifty years ago? Perhaps
Marshall would not have feared Rule 11, but perhaps he should have.
Indeed, one of his successors at the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), Julius Chambers, was sanc-
tioned when he unsuccessfully litigated a race discrimination civil
rights lawsuit while in private practice.
6 8
Second, what is hyperactivity and who defines it? Unfortunately,
interpretation of Rule 11 is likely to involve a continuing focus on the
merits, that is, the contents, of papers. This will lead to many of the
same chilling effect problems associated with the Rule's 1983 version.
There is also likely to be a tendency to focus on the "speedy and inex-
pensive" aspects of Rule 11, as opposed to the "just" part. The stakes
are high. If we reorient the legal profession toward a significant role
as officers of the court, we run the serious risk that we will be impair-
ing the independence of the bar, independence that contributed to the
evolution of law in this country.
There are striking examples of what can happen when a lawyer
becomes a tool of the state. It may seem farfetched to remind our-
selves of what happened in Nazi Germany, but startlingly similar ex-
amples of injustice have occurred in the United States: Lawyers
enforced the Jim Crow laws, contributed to keeping ethnic Japanese
confined at concentration camps in the United States during World
War II, and turned their backs on persons accused of being commu-
be correct that courts would not have sanctioned lawyers trying to overturn the Plessy
separate-but-equal doctrine. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), for example, the
Court found violations of the equal protection clause on the theory that the graduate edu-
cational facilities provided to black students were not equivalent to those offered to white
students. 339 U.S. at 633-34, 641. The Court, however, refused to reexamine Plessy. One
could argue, therefore, that the Court was softening to arguments that Plessy should be
overruled. One wonders, however, how receptive district courts would be to eviscerating
the doctrine of separate-but-equal in the face of the Court's consistent refusal to reexam-
ine Plessy. Even if the Supreme Court were later to overturn the doctrine, as it did in
Brown, attorneys would likely have been confronted with sanctions motions since states
were known to vehemently protect and promote segregationist policies. An attorney may
have believed it prudent to alter litigation strategy and may have been consumed with a
Rule 11 defense and the inherent conflicts created between client interests and attorney
interests. Alternatively, an attorney may have refused to pursue a case unless it could be
squeezed into the "non-equal" theory the Court was beginning to embrace.
68. Harris v. Marsh, 123 F.R.D. 204 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (raising $30,000 judgment against
Chambers by additional $4000), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Blue v. United
States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991).
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nists during the McCarthy era. These are just a few examples of what
can happen when lawyers ignore individual rights.
There may be times when the majority is so alarmed about a real
or perceived threat that political pressures are created, resulting in
laws or policies that infringe on individual or group rights. Those
fears are understandable. But that is all the more reason why it is
important to protect from retribution those lawyers willing to take on
the unpopular client or cause of the day.
C. The Need to Protect Individual Access to Courts
Another form of lawyer independence must be mentioned.
There is a risk that the federal courts will succeed in weeding out indi-
vidual-oriented cases, leaving the courts open primarily for big corpo-
rate disputes. In 1914 Louis Brandeis wrote of the threat presented to
our society when lawyers become mere tools for corporate America.
He stated that
[i]t is true at the present time the lawyer does not hold as
high a position with the people as he held seventy-five or
indeed fifty years ago; but the reason is not lack of opportu-
nity. It is this: Instead of holding a position of indepen-
dence, between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb
the excesses of either, able lawyers have, to a large extent,
allowed themselves to become adjuncts of great corporations
and have neglected the obligation to use their powers for the
protection of the people.69
The drive toward greater "professionalism," especially in the con-
text of Rule 11, may in essence be a code word for keeping the little
people, with their petty grievances and unpolished lawyers, out of the
system. Meanwhile big-firm lawyers may be engaging in the very
practices that Judge Stanley Sporkin lamented during the Savings and
Loan (S&L) crisis: "Where were [the lawyers]" and "[w]hy didn't any
of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the transactions?"7
Judge Schwarzer is correct in pointing out that Judge Sporkin
criticized the lawyers in the S&L debacle for failing to exercise their
independent judgment.71 However, blind independence in favor of
corporate interests is as dangerous to individual liberties as govern-
mental repression because both corporations and the government are
69. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in BusiNss-A PROFESSION 329,
337-39 (1933).
70. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).
71. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 34.
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powerful agents vis-a-vis the people. Judge Schwarzer quotes attor-
ney Sol Linowitz's recent observation that lawyers have "lost the abil-
ity to differentiate between what you can do and what you ought to
do."72 Harkening back to Lord Brougham and Lon Fuller, as well as
Louis Brandeis, it is the representation of individuals-the less pow-
erful and influential-and the necessity that lawyers be able to seek to
vindicate individual rights that is of critical concern. 73
Moreover, the irony is that the generally highly paid lawyers who
engage in corporate-driven practices are far less likely to be sanc-
tioned pursuant to a procedural rule like Rule 11. On the other hand,
those lawyers, typically solo practitioners, who represent individual or
group interests against governmental or corporate interests-gener-
ally with no prospect of significant financial remuneration-run the
risk of sanctions, sometimes of a draconian nature.74
Society cannot afford to chill the Thurgood Marshalls or the Ju-
lius Chambers or their hundreds of lesser-known, and sometimes con-
cededly lesser-prepared, -organized, and -coherent comrades. To the
extent that Rule 11 is chilling lawyers, especially lawyers who bring
individual rights cases, it is a cure for abuse that we cannot afford.
Indeed, a recent survey demonstrated that 19.3% of lawyers reported
72. Ld.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54, 70.
74. Although the average Rule 11 sanction is approximately $2500, there are a substan-
tial number of five- and six-figure awards and even a few seven-figure awards. VAIRO,
supra note 2, § 9.03[a], at 9-16 to -17 & n.60.
More importantly, it is well recognized that lawyers for individuals are far more likely
to be chilled than corporate lawyers or those working for other entities, such as the State.
See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 21, at 871 nn.319-21. Professor Wilkins explains:
The picture looks quite different, however, from the perspective of the typi-
cal individual client trying to convince her lawyer to pursue a marginal but viable
claim despite the threat of external sanctions. If the lawyer is operating under a
contingent fee agreement, she must weigh the already speculative possibility of
winning on the merits and recovering a substantial fee against the danger that she
will lose the case and be sanctioned. For these lawyers, sanctions may make an
already risky legal practice economically infeasible. If the client is paying by the
hour, she will have difficulty determining whether certain actions-such as mas-
sive discovery requests, extensive legal research, consulting with experts-are be-
ing taken for her benefit or the lawyer's. In either case, the individual client with
a plausible legal claim is likely to be the loser.
Of course, the fear of personal liability will undoubtedly chill some corporate
lawyers from pursuing legitimate client projects. Indeed, one can easily imagine a
legislatively created administrative agency similar to OSHA adopting a set of pro-
cedures-for example, giving administrative officials substantial discretion to dis-
bar lawyers for initiating "frivolous" claims against the [S]tate-that would
significantly cool the ardor of even the most highly paid and closely monitored
corporate advocate. Nevertheless, the risk that the threat of sanctions will chill
creative advocacy is a much greater problem for individuals than for corporations.
Id. at 871-72 (footnotes omitted).
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not filing papers they thought had merit because of Rule 11.75 That
number is excessively high.
Turning now to where Judge Schwarzer left off, will courts inter-
pret Rule 11 as a conduct-regulating rule? How will the amendments
work? Will the amendments cure the problems inherent in the 1983
version of the Rule? This Article examines the provisions of the
amended Rule in the context of the criticisms raised about the 1983
version, and in the context of the threat to our adversarial system.
This Article then comments on whether the provisions improve the
1983 version. The Article concludes with concerns over the drift away
from merits-based adjudication to the use of procedural reform to
curb perceived abuses that may lead to undermining the indepen-
dence of the bar to the detriment of us all.
II. THE 1993 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 11
A. The Amendment Process
Beginning in August 1990, the Advisory Committee undertook an
extensive study of Rule 11 by issuing a call for comments.76 The com-
mittee held hearings in February 1991, and issued a proposed draft of
an amended Rule that spring and a revised draft the following
spring.7 7 The Advisory Committee took seriously the issues that Rule
11 critics raised and made a valiant attempt to save the Rule's benefi-
cial aspects yet fix those aspects that created problems. The effort
may prove unsuccessful, but it is a positive development to see the
Advisory Committee so responsive to the concerns of the bar.
As suggested in its interim report, the Advisory Committee con-
cluded that although some of the criticisms of Rule 11 were "exagger-
ated or premised on faulty assumptions," widespread criticisms were
"not without some merit. '78 The Committee noted that Rule 11: (1)
has impacted plaintiffs "more frequently and severely than defend-
ants;" (2) has "occasionally" created problems for litigants seeking to
75. Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REv.
943, 983 (1992). The problem is not limited to "public interest" cases. There are other
arenas, such as antitrust law, in which overly zealous application of Rule 11 will chill effec-
tive advocacy and hinder the development of law in complex areas. See Daniel E.
Lazaroff, Rule 11 and Federal Antitrust Litigation, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1033 (1993).
76. See VAIRO, supra note 2, § 2.04, for a discussion of the amendment process.
77. Id.
78. Letter from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Chairman of the Advisory Committee for Civil
Rules, to Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure 1 (May 1, 1992), in 146 F.R.D. 401, 523 (1993) (as revised in light of
action taken by Standing Committee at its meeting on July 18-20, 1991).
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assert novel legal positions or needing discovery from an adversary;
(3) is enforced too infrequently "through nonmonetary sanctions, with
cost-shifting having become the normative sanction;" (4) contains no
incentive to withdraw claims that become insupportable; and (5)
sometimes creates attorney-client conflicts and "exacerbate[s] conten-
tious behavior between counsel."7 9
The Advisory Committee refused to adopt the suggestion that, in
essence, it return the Rule to its pre-1983 state."0 The nature of the
Advisory Committee's amendments to Rule 11 indicates its belief that
the Rule was overinclusive in some respects and underinclusive in
others. Thus, some of the amendments would narrow, and others
broaden, the scope of the Rule.
The Advisory Committee rewrote the Rule and organized it into
four sections. Perhaps most importantly, the Advisory Committee re-
placed the fifth sentence of Rule 11, which contained the 1983 version
of the certification requirements,8 with new subsection (b), which
now contains the triggering events for Rule 11 liability and the new
certification requirements. The Committee also added subsection (c),
which contains a number of important new procedural protections.82
Finally, in subsection (d), the Advisory Committee made Rule 11
wholly inapplicable to discovery. The purpose of the revisions was to
"remedy problems that have arisen in the interpretation and applica-
tion of [Rule 11]1183 and to "reduce the number of motions for sanc-
tions presented to the court.
8 4
79. Id.
80. According to the Advisory Committee, the revision is designed to increase "the
fairness and effectiveness of the rule as a means to deter presentation and maintenance of
frivolous positions, while also reducing the frequency of Rule 11 motions." Id. The revi-
sion does not adopt the suggestions made by many that sanctions be imposed only for
willful violations. Such changes would be inappropriate in view of the modifications in the
wording of the obligations, in effect permitting a party, especially if candid in its papers, to
advance innovative theories of law and make allegations on information and belief. Such
changes would also be inappropriate in view of the "safe harbor" from Rule 11 motions
through the opportunity, after notice, to withdraw voluntarily from insupportable posi-
tions. See id. In light of these changes, violations would rarely involve conduct that is not
either willful or deceptive, and hence some form of sanctions should be imposed. Id.
81. See VAIRO, supra note 2, § 1.04 and chs. 5 and 6 for a complete discussion of the
certification requirements of Rule 11 and the importance of the signature.
82. See infra part II.B.2.
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
advisory committee's notes, reprinted in VAIRO, supra note 2, app. J at J-21 [hereinafter
1993 advisory committee's notes].
84. Id. at J-22.
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B. Analysis of Amended Rule 11
This part of the Article analyzes the amendments that pertain to
the chilling effect and satellite litigation problems that pose the great-
est threats to attorney independence.
1. Rule 11(b)-representations to the court
Amended Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or un-
represented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on
the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on a lack of information and belief. 5
a. new triggering event
Signing a paper in violation of Rule 11's standard triggered a vio-
lation of the Rule under the 1983 amendments. Under this so-called
snapshot rule, a court could not sanction an attorney who had made a
reasonable inquiry before filing a paper but who refused to withdraw
the paper when subsequent discovery or research showed the position
taken was untenable.86 However, the new operative event for trigger-
ing Rule 11 is "presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, sub-
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reprinted in VAIRO, supra note 2, app. J at J-9 to -10 [hereinafter 1993 Proposed
Amendments].
86. Vairo, supra note 1, at 496.
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mitting, or later advocating)" 87 a paper that violates the Rule's
standard. Thus, the proposed Rule does not expressly incorporate the
continuing duty to withdraw papers.
But, the 1993 amended Rule embraces the "continuing duty the-
ory": Once it is clear that a position is no longer tenable, a litigant
may not continue to press the position in writings or in oral presenta-
tions to the court.88 As revised, it is clear that although there is no
duty to formally withdraw the paper or position taken, withdrawal of
the paper will generally immunize the target from sanctions. 89
Signing a paper in violation of the Rule's standards continues to
trigger the amended Rule 11.90 In addition, "filing, submitting, or
later advocating" 91 a paper triggers the amended Rule. The word "ad-
vocating" in the text of the proposed Rule means that continuing to
advocate a position orally after a paper has been signed, filed, or sub-
mitted may trigger Rule 11.92
The "later advocating" portion of the Rule raises some interest-
ing questions. It seems clear that orally arguing a frivolous claim at a
status conference would subject a litigant to Rule 11 sanctions. But
would serving a discovery request aimed at proving a baseless claim
be considered later advocating?
More importantly, the later advocating language raises the same
kinds of questions that an attorney must confront when served with a
Rule 11 motion.93 Judge Schwarzer notes that attorneys will have dif-
ficulty deciding when a claim ceases to have any merit.94 For example,
when should an attorney know that testimony, documents, or other
information are "sufficiently conclusive to render a prior allegation
baseless"?
95
In any event this broadening of the Rule was unnecessary; it is
relatively easy to retrigger Rule 11. If discovery or further research
reveals that a position is unsupportable, and an adversary refuses to
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
88. Id.




93. See id. at J-28 to -29.
94. Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 16.
95. Id. For a discussion of the case law that presumably survives the 1993 amendments
on the question whether an attorney is required to disbelieve a client, see VAIRO, supra
note 2, § 6.03[b][2].
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withdraw it, Rule 11 is retriggered when the adversary files baseless
papers in opposition to a dispositive motion.
b. reasonable inquiry requirement retained
While modifying the language slightly, the 1993 amended version
of Rule 11 retains the "reasonable inquiry" requirement. The Advi-
sory Committee rejected the suggestion of some commentators that it
would be preferable to delete the reasonable inquiry requirement and
to require instead that only nonfrivolous papers be filed. There had
been criticism of the "conduct" approach because it could lead to
wasteful judicial inquiry into an attorney's actions before filing, even
when the paper filed was colorable.
According to most commentators, however, the requirement that
attorneys stop and think before filing has been effective in deterring
baseless filings.96 The Advisory Committee understandably saw no
reason to abandon the one aspect of the Rule that has been somewhat
successful. On the other hand, courts should not inquire into what an
attorney did before filing unless the paper is groundless; such inquiry
adds to wasteful satellite litigation without weeding out unmeritorious
claims. That level of scrutiny also raises the privacy concerns dis-
cussed by Justices Murphy and Jackson almost fifty years ago in Hick-
man v. Taylor.97 Successful-or lucky-guessers should not be
punished because the effect would be to chill access to the courts.
c. duty of candor
The Advisory Committee makes clear in its Notes that one of
Rule 11's purposes is to emphasize the duty of candor. Although con-
tinuing to "require litigants to 'stop-and-think' before initially making
legal or factual contentions, 98 the revised Rule places equal emphasis
on the duty of candor and on the obligation to withdraw from posi-
tions when they are no longer tenable.99
There are two problems with the incorporation of the duty of
candor. First, to the extent that the duty permits sanctions to be im-
posed because of the way in which a position is argued, the duty is an
unnecessary extension of the Rule. If the argument identification,
miscitation, or misrepresentation of fact is willful, other sanctions exist
96. Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 11 n.25.
97. 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
98. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-23. For a discussion of cases
on the duty of candor, see VAIRO, supra note 2, § 5.03[c].
99. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-23.
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to punish the offender, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927100 or the court's in-
herent power as discussed in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc."0o There is no
need to augment Rule 11.
This Author agrees with Judge Schwarzer's view that it is a good
idea to punish lawyers who lie to the court.1°2 As the Ninth Circuit in
Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp."°3 pointed out,
however, the line between appropriate advocacy on behalf of the cli-
ent on the one hand, and out-and-out lying and misrepresentation on
the other, is sometimes a hard line to draw." Clearly the system
ought to punish the latter, but Rule 11 was not necessary to address
such abuses.
Second, Judge Schwarzer's argument becomes dangerous when
he claims that Rule 11 is intended to do more than stop abuse.10 5
There is no question that lawyers should be careful and litigate in a
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (mandating personal liability for attor-
neys who unreasonably or vexatiously create excessive costs).
101. 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (discussing federal courts' inherent power to impose sanctions
for bad-faith conduct in litigation).
102. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 32.
103. ?01 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
104. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 29. When lying is identified, however, bad faith
should easily be established, thereby implicating either 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the court's
inherent power to sanction.
Enforcement proceedings are an important arena for debating conflicting vi-
sions of the lawyer's role. Consider again Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp. At one level, Golden Eagle simply represents a disagreement
between the district judge and the appeals panel over the literal command of rule
11. Such an interpretation, however, masks the importance of the disagreement
expressed in the opinions. The district court's opinion, based squarely on the
need to protect the court's ability to reach accurate decisions, argues that candor
to the court must take precedence over "creativity" in advancing client interests.
The court of appeals opinion, on the other hand, rejects the view that rule 11 was
designed to protect the integrity of the court, and instead characterizes the con-
flict as between a "lawyer's duty zealously to represent his client ... and the
lawyer's own interest in avoiding rebuke." Not surprisingly, it concludes that the
former duty must take precedence.
The opinions in Golden Eagle, therefore, represent a fundamental disagree-
ment about the proper balance between public and private understandings of pro-
fessional independence. What is most significant is that this debate is taking place
at all. For the first time, judges are actively debating the proper balance between
client and systemic interests. And, because these discussions occur around the
decisions of actual cases, these debates confront issues of institutional compe-
tence and the significance of context.
Whatever sanctioning systems we employ, therefore, must do more than effi-
ciently control a static set of professional norms; they must also help us choose
among competing conceptions of the lawyer's role. At a minimum, enforcement
proceedings should presumptively be open and accessible to ensure that informa-
tion about the conduct in question and the standards being applied can be re-
viewed and critiqued.
Wilkins, supra note 21, at 883-84 (quoting Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540).
105. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 12-13.
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manner that keeps costs and delay to a reasonable level, thereby pro-
moting the aims of Rule 1.106 But in the face of Rule l1's potential
chilling effects and the rights that may be at stake, where is the case
for "broadening" the scope of attorneys' obligations to the courts?
d. certification
The new certification language is quite different from the 1983
version of Rule 11.
i. facts
The certification with respect to facts has been totally rewritten.
The Advisory Committee recognized that the 1983 version of Rule 11
placed an unequal burden on plaintiffs and defendants and that a liti-
gant may have good reason to believe, without actually knowing, that
a fact is true or false. Thus, the Advisory Committee modified the
certification language with respect to facts.10 7
The revision created two subsections to distinguish between fac-
tual contentions and factual denials. Subsection (b)(3) of the 1993
amendments pertains to contentions and requires that "the allegations
and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifi-
cally so identified, [be] likely to have evidentiary support after a rea-
sonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."'
08
Subsection (b)(4) pertains to denials and requires that "the denials of
factual contentions [be] warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, [be] reasonably based on a lack of information or belief."'1 9
There is no quarrel here with using different language for conten-
tions and denials so long as courts do not treat baseless complaints
less harshly than baseless denials. 10
To ensure that the proposal will be understood as softening the
Rule, the Advisory Committee noted that the standard is not whether
a party has sufficient facts to prevail, but rather whether the conten-
tion has or is likely to have "evidentiary support.""' In that sense the
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 1 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." Id.
107. For a discussion of this problem, see VAIRO, supra note 2, §§ 4.01[b], 6.03[f].
108. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-18.
109. Id.
110. Some courts view frivolous complaints as more problematic than frivolous answers
or other papers because the complaint "starts" the battle. See VAIRO, supra note 2,
§§ 4.01[b][2][A], 5.05[b]; infra notes 264-70.
111. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-24.
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proposal narrows the Rule. It then broadens the Rule by requiring
that the contention be withdrawn when the position taken is no longer
warranted." 2
The concept is positive to the extent that it provides a more for-
giving standard when a litigant is not in possession of relevant facts.
The problem, however, will be in the implementation. If the amended
Rule is used like the 1983 version, this change will likely cause an
increase in satellite litigation. Moreover, the new provision can be
used to whipsaw litigants in connection with the new disclosure re-
quirement of Rule 26.113 For example, adversaries can argue that fail-
ure to disclose implicates a prima facie Rule 11 violation.
ii. law
The 1993 amendment to Rule 11(b)(2) requires that "the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions therein [be] warranted by ex-
isting law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law."
114
The key change is the substitution of the words "nonfrivolous argu-
ment" for "good faith argument." The attempt is to provide a more
objective-sounding standard. A paragraph has been added to the 1993
Advisory Committee's Notes to provide guidance as to the meaning of
"nonfrivolous." 5 The Notes explain that so long as there is some
support for a legal position, for example, a dissenting opinion, the
standard in another jurisdiction, or a law review article-but presum-
ably not one's own-the proponent of a paper should be immunized
from sanctions." 6
Judge Schwarzer agreed that the standard under the 1983 version
of Rule 11 did not provide sufficient guidance to courts and that there
was excessive variance in finding Rule 11 violations." 7 For example, a
recent Federal Bar Association study showed that federal judges disa-
gree sixty percent of the time on whether a particular fact pattern jus-
tifies sanctions.11 The big "if" in the interpretation of amended Rule
112. Id. at J-23 to -25.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 26; see Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 17-19.
114. FED. R. Cxv. P. 11(b)(2).
115. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-25.
116. Id.
117. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 10-12.
118. CARL B. HILLIARD & MICHAEL E. CHISHOLM, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL BAR
AssoCIATION, RULE 11 SURVEY 12 (1992). Indeed, Judge Schwarzer concedes that
although courts have "had abundant opportunity, [they have] never succeeded in articulat-
ing universally accepted and workable standards of sanctionable conduct and sanctionable
November 1994]
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11 is whether, with regard to frivolousness, courfs will continue to
"know it when they see it," or whether they will analyze legal argu-
ments in the more forgiving way that the Advisory Committee sug-
gests. As Judge Schwarzer notes, the concern is that judges will focus
unduly on content rather than conduct and thereby turn losing argu-
ments into sanctionable ones in too many cases.
2. Rule 11(c)-sanctions
The 1993 amendments make a number of important changes in
subsection (c). First, sanctions are no longer mandatory. Second, a
number of procedural protections have been added, including express
provisions for notice and opportunity to be heard, and a requirement
that the court imposing sanctions describe the violation and explain
the basis for the sanction chosen. Third, a safe harbor provision has
been added. Fourth, law firms, in addition to the signers of papers,
can be held responsible for Rule 11 violations. Fifth, there are impor-
tant limitations on the sanctions that may be imposed. The 1993 Ad-
visory Committee's Notes contain a detailed explanation of most of
the changes.119
a. from "shall" to "may"
As in the 1991 proposal, the May 1992 Advisory Committee pro-
posal continued to require mandatory sanctions for violations of Rule
11. The proposed Rule provided that if a court determines that Rule
11 had been violated, the court "shall" impose an appropriate sanc-
ti6n.12 0 At its meeting in June '1992, the Standing Committee re-
sponded to critics of mandatory sanctions by voting to change the
word "shall" to "may" in order to give courts discretion as to whether
a sanction should be imposed. The 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes
to subsections (b) and (c) do not reflect this change in the text, contin-
uing to state that the rule "mandat[es] sanctions for violations of these
obligations.'' This language probably will be deleted to reflect the
change. However, certain language in the Notes does reflect the spirit
content." Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 10. Despite the Advisory Committee's admoni-
tions, is substitution of the word "nonfrivolous" for "good faith argument" likely to pro-
vide courts with any more guidance for applying coherent standards?
119. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-25 to -30.
120. 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 85, at J-14.
121. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-23.
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of the change: "Whether a violation has occurred... [is] committed
to the discretion of the trial court.. .."122
Although the change from "shall" to "may" may appear cos-
metic, it was an important point for critics of Rule 11.11 Moreover,
the change is critical because it is a signal that courts and litigants
should be less zealous in using Rule 11 in cases involving relatively
minor infractions of the Rule. This decreased reliance on Rule 11
should result in less satellite litigation.
b. procedural changes
i. due process
There was no mention of due process requirements in the text of
the 1983 version of Rule 11, although the 1983 Advisory Committee's
Note contained a brief discussion of due process. 2 4 A complex body
of case law discussing the degree of due process required in con-
nection with Rule 11 has evolvedY'5 The 1993 version of Rule 11 now
explicitly requires "notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond."'12 6
Two other changes in the Rule ensure that proper notice will be
given. First, Rule 11(c)(1)(A) requires litigants to make a separate
Rule 11 motion describing the conduct believed to be a Rule 11 viola-
tion, and provides the target of the motion twenty-one days to with-
draw or correct the challenged paper. 2 7 Second, Rule 11(c)(1)(B)
requires judges who wish to impose Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte to
describe the conduct that appears to violate the Rule and to issue an
order to show cause why the target has not violated the Rule.
2s
Unfortunately, the 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes do not pro-
vide the courts with much guidance as to the meaning of the phrase "a
reasonable opportunity to be heard." The Notes state that "[w]hether
the matter should be decided solely on the basis of written submis-
sions or should be scheduled for oral argument (or, indeed, for evi-
dentiary presentation) will depend on the circumstances."' 29 The
Notes do suggest, however, that it would be inappropriate for a court
122. Id. at J-28.
123. See Vairo, supra note 1, at 500-01.
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
125. See VArRO, supra note 2, §§ 7.01-7.04.
126. FED. R. Cirv. P. 11(c).
127. FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
128. FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c)(1)(B).
129. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-28.
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to impose sanctions without at least entertaining papers on the ques-
tion of whether the Rule was violated. 30
ii. findings
Courts have disagreed over the need for, or extent of, findings
required under the 1983 version of Rule 11.131 In the 1993 version,
Rule 11(c)(3) requires courts to describe the conduct that violates the
Rule and to explain the basis for the sanction imposed. 32
This is a positive development that provides some protection for
Rule 11 targets. It will be insufficient for a court simply to state that a
claim is frivolous and that $XXX will be imposed as a sanction. The
1993 Advisory Committee's Notes state that the required findings
must be made in a written submission or on the record. 33 The Notes
also suggest that the right to these findings can be waived. 134 Thus,
sanctioned attorneys are well advised to invoke Rule 11(c)(3) in all
cases.
The text does not require findings if a court decides not to impose
sanctions. Because Rule 11 movants have no right to a sanctions
award, and because the 1993 proposed Rule is discretionary and not
mandatory, there should be no need for findings if a court decides not
to impose sanctions. Nevertheless, part of a sentence in the 1993 Ad-
visory Committee's Notes may result in some confusion: "[T]he court
should not ordinarily have to explain its denial of a motion for
sanctions. 35
iii. standard of review
The text of the proposed Rule makes no mention of the appropri-
ate standard of review, but the 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes
make clear that the abuse of discretion standard adopted by the
Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.1 36 should be ap-
plied.137 This clarification is important because if the "loose abuse"
standard is applied in cases in which sanctions are imposed, an impor-
tant safeguard will be lost.
130. See id.
131. See VAmRo, supra note 2, § 7.05.
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).
133. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-28.
134. See id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. 496 U.S. 384 (1990); see also VAmRo, supra note 2, § 8.04[d][51 (discussing cases
applying Cooter & Gell standard).
137. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-28.
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iv. timing questions
The text of the proposed Rule also fails to address the various
timing questions that have been discussed in the Rule 11 case law
since 1983.138 The 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes, however, do ad-
dress the timing question and provide district courts with some gui-
dance and considerable flexibility. The Notes suggest that Rule 11
motions should generally be filed "promptly" but indicate that in
some cases it would be inappropriate to move until after the target has
had time for reasonable discovery.'39 This positive suggestion is con-
sistent with the proposed textual changes that recognize that a litigant
may not possess all the relevant facts supporting his or her position
until after discovery is taken. As to when the motion should be de-
cided, the Notes encourage courts to defer the ruling until the end of
the case in order to prevent conflicts of interest and attorney-client
privilege problems.140
c. safe harbor provision
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) ensures that adequate notice will be given to
Rule 11 targets, clarifies the procedure for making Rule 11 motions,
and provides a "safe harbor." Subsection (c)(1)(A) requires a sepa-
rate motion to be served under Rule 5 but "not ... filed with or
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the mo-
tion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged
paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not with-
drawn or appropriately corrected.'
141
The purpose of this revision is to make it possible for a litigant to
withdraw a claim that he or she knows is not supportable without hav-
ing to risk Rule 11 sanctions.142 The motion must set forth specifically
the defect in the pleading.143 This specificity requirement is probably
intended to reduce the current practice of making threats or sending
vague "Rule 11 letters" aimed at bullying an opponent into withdraw-
ing a paper or abandoning a position.
138. For a discussion of when a notice of a Rule 11 violation or a Rule 11 motion should
be made, see VAIRO, supra note 2, §§ 1.05[b][2], 2.02[a][3], 7.07[a]-[fJ. For a discussion of
the timing of the court's decision, see id. § 7.07[f].
139. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-28.
140. For a discussion of these problems, see VAIRO, supra note 2, § 7.04[f].
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
142. See 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-29.
143. See id.
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Subsection (c)(1)(B) provides another "safe harbor" when a
court imposes sanctions sua sponte after a case has been settled or
voluntarily dismissed. In that situation the court may not impose
monetary sanctions unless it issues an order specifically describing the
Rule-violating conduct and requiring the party to show cause why the
Rule was not violated.144
The safe harbor is an important protection for Rule 11 targets.
Moreover, it serves the streamlining purpose that the 1983 architects
of Rule 11 originally envisioned. It immunizes litigants from Rule 11
sanctions if they withdraw the challenged paper. The 1993 Note ex-
plains that under existing case law, litigants "were sometimes reluc-
tant to abandon a questionable contention lest that be viewed as
evidence of a violation of Rule 112"4 A litigant who has made a
mistake should have the opportunity to withdraw a paper without suf-
fering sanctions. However, to the extent that the proposed amend-
ments shift the focus from a paper as a whole to each individual aspect
of a paper, there will be a potential for more mistakes and thus more
opportunity to attack. Unfortunately, therefore, the safe harbor may
provide little relief and, when combined with other proposed amend-
ments, instead increase confusion and collateral litigation. 46
The 1993 amendment's safe harbor is an improvement over the
1991 proposed amendment. Although both versions fail to incorpo-
rate the "paper-as-a-whole" doctrine, 47 the 1993 version deletes some
of the litany of aspects of a paper that may trigger Rule 11. This
change, together with permissive rather than mandatory sanctions, 48
and the de-emphasis of fee-based sanctions, 49 offers a better chance
that the latest version of Rule 11 will result in fewer Rule 11 motions.
Unfortunately, however, in some cases the safe harbor may
merely push back the time for making hard decisions. Assume that
you decided to take Linda Brown's case. Your adversary served a
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B).
145. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-29.
146. See VAIRO, supra note 2, § 5.04[a].
147. See id §§ 2.04[b][1][10], 2.04[e][1][B]. For a discussion of the paper-as-a-whole ap-
proach to evaluating Rule 11 motions, see id. § 4.01[e]. The Advisory Committee makes
clear in its notes that each aspect of a paper should be analyzed and that the sanctions
imposed should flow directly from that analysis. Thus, the paper-as-a-whole approach, by
which a litigant who filed a paper containing baseless as well as colorable claims would not
be sanctioned if the paper as a whole was colorable, has been abandoned. Unfortunately,
the emphasis on each aspect, rather than on analyzing the paper-as-a-whole, will encourage
counterproductive Rule 11 activity. See id.
148. Id. § 2.04[e][1][C][i]; see supra part II.B.2.a.
149. See VAiRo, supra note 2, § 2.04[e][1][C][v]; infra part I.B.2.f.ii.
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Rule 11 motion, citing Plessy v. Ferguson1 50 and its progeny. You
want to respond that you are making a nonfrivolous argument for a
change in the law, but will the judge agree with you? Judge Schwarzer
would say that as long as you explain your argument's purpose and
basis you will not be sanctioned.' 5' He would further argue that there
has been some recent movement in the law.' 52 However, the Rule's
standard is "nonfrivolous."'153 Thus, you are left worrying about what
the individual judge will think and what might happen on appeal.
Studies have shown tremendous judicial variance as to when sanctions
are appropriate. 54
d. jurisdiction after a case has been settled or voluntarily dismissed
The Advisory Committee would continue to permit sanctions to
be imposed on motion if a case is settled or voluntarily dismissed. 55
However, the requirement that a motion for sanctions be delayed un-
til twenty-one days after the target has had the opportunity to settle or
voluntarily withdraw 56 should reduce the kind of "sandbagging" that
the Supreme Court permitted in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.'
57
It was unfortunate that under the 1983 Rule, a party that voluntarily
dismissed its claim would be subject to a postdismissal sanctions mo-
tion when it thought that the litigation was over.' 58 Under the 1993
amendment, a Rule 11 motion cannot be made unless there is some
paper, claim, or contention that can be withdrawn. 59 Thus, a poten-
tial Rule 11 target need not worry about sanctions if it withdraws a
paper or its position before a motion is made.
Similarly, pursuant to subsection (c)(1)(B), when a court seeks to
impose sanctions sua sponte, monetary sanctions may not be imposed
unless the order to show cause was issued before settlement or volun-
tary dismissal.' 60 Thus, a party need not have to worry about postdis-
missal sanctions from either its adversary or the court.
150. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
151. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 28-31, 35.
152. See id. at 28-36.
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
154. See supra part II.B.l.d.ii.
155. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-29 to -30.
156. Id. at J-19.
157. 496 U.S. 384 (1990); see infra notes 202-26, 242-43 and accompanying text.
158. See VAIRO, supra note 2, § 3.02[b].
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)(B).
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e. nonsigner liability
In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,1 61 the
Supreme Court ruled that only the attorney signing a paper could be
sanctioned under Rule 11. Other lawyers or the law firm could not
be.'6 Many have argued that a greater deterrent effect could be
achieved by imposing sanctions on other attorneys also responsible for
the violation. 6 Thus, the 1993 amendments permit the court to im-
pose sanctions on the law firm or other lawyers as well.164 Indeed, the
1993 Advisory Committee's Notes accompanying the amendments
suggest that the law firm ordinarily should be held responsible for the
Rule 11 violations of its partners or associates.' 65
The 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes also suggest that courts
may find it appropriate to make an inquiry to determine who should
bear responsibility for the Rule 11 violation. 66 The Notes state that
in some cases the court may determine that it is appropriate to impose
sanctions on other attorneys in the firm, co-counsel, the law firm,
other law firms, or the party.' 67 The court also may determine that it
is appropriate to sanction one or more of those persons rather than
the signer.' 68 For example, employers often substantially restrict gov-
ernment or other institutional attorneys regarding the positions they
may take. The 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes suggest that in some
cases it may be more appropriate to sanction the entity itself rather
than the individual attorney.'
69
The introduction of nonsigner liability will result in additional
Rule 11 activity as the courts seek to determine who should be sanc-
tioned. However, fairness and practicality require such activity. Law
firms and experienced attorneys may otherwise escape Rule 11 liabil-
ity by having an impecunious junior associate sign papers. The pro-
posed amendment eliminates the "designated signer" problem. While
161. 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
162. Id. at 127.
163. See VAIRO, supra note 2, § 10.02[a][4] (discussing Pavelic & LeFlore).
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).




169. Id. Under proposed subsection (c)(2)(A), monetary sanctions may not be awarded
against a represented party unless it caused the presentation or maintenance of a position
for an improper purpose. Id. at J-21. To the extent that the Advisory Committee was
concerned about attorney-client relations, the proposal will do little. An attorney who
seeks to avoid sanctions may still want to defend by pointing out that the client wanted a
paper filed for some improper purpose, such as to delay the proceedings.
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it would be ideal to expect young attorneys and institutional attorneys
to stand up to their employers, it is preferable to place Rule 11 liabil-
ity where it truly belongs. If senior attorneys, the institution, or the
law firm are held responsible, better law firm and individual practices
may be the result.
f. limitations on sanctions
i. least severe sanction rule
One of the critical problems with Rule 11 is that the use of fee-
based sanctions has encouraged excessive satellite litigation.170 With
attorneys' fees or fee-based sanctions as the norm, there was an incen-
tive to seek sanctions. In recognition of this problem, the 1993
amendments and 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes de-emphasize
fee-based sanctions,1 71 and Rule 11(c)(2) requires courts to impose a
sanction that is "limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." 72
ii. de-emphasis of fee-based sanctions
Instead of isolating attorneys' fees as a type of permissible sanc-
tion, subsection (c)(2) begins by listing a range of possible sanc-
tions.173 Subsection (c)(2) provides for monetary sanctions, but
makes clear that attorneys' fees may be awarded only when sanctions
are imposed on motion and only when necessary to achieve a deter-
rent effect.174 In addition that subsection provides that partial fees
may be awarded and that only fees and costs "incurred as a direct
result of the violation" may be awarded. 75 The 1993 Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes further explain that there is a duty of mitigation. 76
As to the types of sanctions courts should consider, Rule 11(c)(2)
states:
[T]he sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a non-
monetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if
imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence,
an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of
170. See VAiRo, supra note 2, §§ 2.02[b], 2.03[a].
171. See 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-25 to -26.




176. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-26.
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the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred
as a direct result of the violation.
177
The 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes reinforce the. message. The
Notes list a number of other nonmonetary sanctions that courts
should consider' 78 and include a lengthy paragraph that discourages
courts from imposing fee-based sanctions unless they are carefully jus-
tified. 79 The Rule leaves the question of the appropriate sanction to
the court's discretion. 80 The 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes, how-
ever, list numerous factors that may be relevant, such as the wilfulness
of the violation, whether the whole paper or minor parts violated the
rule, the litigant's prior sanctions history, and the financial resources
of the target.' 8
The Rule contains several other limitations. First, Rule
11(c)(2)(A) prohibits the imposition of sanctions against a repre-
sented party if the Rule 11 violation is based on a legal position
taken.1' Second, a court may not award a monetary sanction when
imposing sanctions sua sponte, unless it issues an order to show cause
before a case is voluntarily dismissed or settled. 8 3
3. Rule- 11(d)-inapplicability to discovery
The 1983 version of Rule 11 applied to discovery motions, while
Rule 26(g) applied to discovery requests and responses. 84 Under the
proposed amendments to Rule 11(d), Rule 11 would be wholly inap-
plicable to discovery. 85 The 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes re-
mind litigants that Rules 26(g) and 37 apply to the discovery
process8 6 and point out that Rule 11 is not the only federal sanctions
rule.187 Courts may impose sanctions for contempt under the court's
inherent power, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or under similar rules or stat-
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
178. See 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-25; see also VAiRO, supra
note 2, § 9.03[b] (discussing nonmonetary sanctions).
179. See 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-25 to -26.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
181. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-25 to -26.
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)(A).
183. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)(B).
184. See VAIRO, supra note 2, § 1.04[b].
185. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-21.
186. Id. at J-30.
187. Id.
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utes. s88 If courts interpret Rule 11 as the Advisory Committee in-
tends, with less emphasis on fee-based sanctions, litigants may still
turn to those alternative sources of sanctioning power. Moreover,
Rule 26(g) has not been amended along the same lines as Rule 11.
Signing discovery papers is the only way to trigger Rule 26(g) sanc-
tions liability. However, Rule 26(g) contains no safe harbor or any of
the other procedural protections that have been incorporated into
Rule 11.189 It is possible,. therefore, that there will be a shift to Rules
26(g) and 37 to curb perceived abuses of discovery; this would make a
certain amount of sense given that discovery abuse has long been
thought to be the main cause of delay and excess expense in the fed-
eral courts. 90
III. IMPACr OF THE 1993 AMENDMENTs
The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 will have little impact on the
bulk of the case law that reviews a lawyer's affirmative duty to engage
in reasonable investigation. There are substantial areas of case law,
however, that will be affected by the amendments. For example,
much of the law established by the Supreme Court's four Rule 11
cases will be overturned.
The four Supreme Court cases decided to date, Pavelic & LeFlore
v. Marvel Entertainment Group,191 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp.,'91 Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter-
prises, Inc., 91 and Willy v. Coastal Corp., 91 answered some specific
questions about Rule 11 but raised others. The Court's general ap-
proach has been to interpret Rule 11 literally. The thrust of these
opinions has been to enable a more aggressive approach to Rule 11
that ignores the chilling effect and satellite litigation problems.
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANC-
nONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LIGATION ABUSE (2d ed. 1994), for a discussion of other
sanctions authority.
189. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
190. See Tmothy Joyce, Comment, Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the Federal Courts,
30 CATH. U. L. REv. 273, 284-305 (1981).
191. 493 U.S. 120 (1989), superseded by FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (amended 1993).
192. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
193. 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
194. 112 S. Ct. 1076 (1992).
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A. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group: May
NonSigners Be Sanctioned?
The first case, Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment
Group,195 set the tone. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia stated
that the Court "give[s] the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their
plain meaning."'196 The question in Pavelic & LeFlore was whether
only the attorney who signed a paper that violated Rule 11 could be
sanctioned, or whether the attorney's law firm could be sanctioned as
well. Finding that the language of the rule permitted only the signer
to be sanctioned, the Court stated: "Our task is to apply the text, not
to improve upon it." 97
Although the effect of Justice Scalia's opinion was to limit law
firm liability and appears to be the augur of a more sensitive, interpre-
tive approach to the Rule, it is clear that he was not trying to limit
Rule 11's force. Rather, Justice Scalia took the occasion to opine
about the Rule's purpose. Although he agreed that it would "better
guarantee reimbursement of the innocent party" to permit sanctions
to be imposed against the law firm, he found that Rule 11's key pur-
pose is deterrence. 98 The Rule itself speaks in terms of "sanction"
not reimbursement. 99 Moreover,
[i]t is at least arguable that these purposes are better served
by a provision which makes clear that, just as the court ex-
pects the signer personally-and not some nameless person
within his law firm-to validate the truth and legal reasona-
bleness of the papers filed, so also it will visit upon him per-
sonally-and not his law firm-its retribution for failing in
that responsibility. The message thereby conveyed to the at-
torney, that this is not a "team effort" but in the last analysis
yours alone, is precisely the point of Rule 11.2
While the emphasis on the Rule's deterrent effect was worthwhile
to the extent that it minimized fee-shifting sanctions, it is clear that the
Supreme Court had deterrence in mind and not amelioration. This
strict interpretation of Rule 11 thus foreboded problems for those
who would raise claims at the edge of the law. Under the 1983 Rule, if
one filed such a claim but then voluntarily dismissed it, one still ran
195. 493 U.S. 120 (1989), superseded by FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (amended 1993).
196. Id. at 123.
197. Id. at 126.
198. Id.
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
200. Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126-27.
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the risk of being sanctioned. Thus, the reasonable attorney, even one
with a colorable claim, might not have risked pursuing a potentially
meritorious claim for fear of sanctions. There clearly was no free bite
of the apple. Under the 1993 Rule, however, an attorney can with-
draw a paper when served with a Rule 11 motion20' without risking
sanctions.
The 1993 amendments clearly will change the Pavelic & LeFlore
result because the revisions expressly allow the court to impose sanc-
tions on anyone who is culpable. However, the revisions also main-
tain the deterrent emphasis of the Rule; therefore, attorneys who fail
to embrace the safe harbor provision may invite more severe
sanctions.
B. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.2 2 signaled an even tougher ap-
proach to Rule 11. The Cooter & Gell Court faced three issues: (1)
whether the district court had the power to sanction a party who vol-
untarily dismissed an action; (2) what the appellate standard of review
should be; and (3) whether additional sanctions in the form of attor-
neys' fees may be imposed for defending a Rule 11 award on ap-
peal.2 °3 The Court's answers to the first two questions signaled
significant problems in terms of the Rule's chilling effect and associ-
ated satellite litigation.
1. When does a court have jurisdiction to sanction?
With respect to the first issue, the Court found that the district
court had jurisdiction even when a case is voluntarily dismissed under
Rule 41(a)(1)(i).2 4 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion stressed that
the purpose of Rule 11 is to curb abuses of the judicial system. Be-
cause the issue under Rule 11 is collateral to the merits, courts have
continuing jurisdiction to punish abuses.
This analysis was unfortunate. Permitting a litigant to "cure" a
Rule 11 violation by voluntarily dismissing an action would effectively
streamline litigation-one of the goals of the Advisory Committee.20 5
But the Supreme Court allowed the litigant to be punished in Cooter
201. See supra part II.B.2.c.
202. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
203. Id. at 388.
204. Id. at 394-98. This issue is discussed fully in VAIRO, supra note 2, § 3.02[b][3].
205. See 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-22.
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& Gell, years after the complaint was voluntarily dismissed.206 The
Supreme Court's opinion thus exacerbated the satellite litigation
problem; the case was permitted to go on for the purpose of litigating
the sanctions issue, long after the main case was dismitsed. This
comes at the cost of those waiting in the queue.
Fortunately, the 1993 amendments' safe harbor provision will ef-
fectively overrule the result in Cooter & Gell because a litigant will be
given twenty-one days to withdraw an offending paper.2° Thus, if a
case is settled or withdrawn, the adversary will not be permitted to file
a Rule 11 motion. Moreover, a court may not impose monetary sanc-
tions sua sponte unless it issues an order to show cause before the case
is dropped.208
2. What is the appellate standard of review?
The Court's adoption of the abuse of discretion standard of ap-
pellate review in Cooter & Gell is problematic. 20 9 The Court correctly
noted that the district court has the best overall view of the litigant's
conduct,210 but there is widespread concern that Rule 11 is not being
applied fairly or consistently.21' Giving the courts of appeals the op-
portunity to quickly affirm denials of sanctions is one thing; giving
undue deference to district courts that have imposed sanctions is an-
other. The Thomas212 approach, which adopted an abuse of discre-
tion standard but called for differing levels of scrutiny depending on
the district court's analysis, is preferable. The 1993 Advisory Commit-
tee's Notes state that the abuse of discretion standard will continue to
be employed. 213 Thus, the approach to the standard of review taken
by the courts of appeals will be critical.
206. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 398.
207. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-19.
208. Id. at J-21.
209. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 409. For a full discussion of this issue, see VAIRO, supra
note 2, § 8.04. See also iL § 2.03[c][2] (discussing standard of appellate review necessary to
alleviate chilling effect and satellite litigation problems).
210. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402.
211. Judge Sam D. Johnson et al., The Least Severe Sanction Adequate: Reversing the
Trend in Rule 11 Sanctions, 61 Miss. LU. 39 (1991).
212. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 872-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc);
see VAIRO, supra note 2, § 2.03[c][2]; see also Johnson et al., supra note 211, at 45-47
(noting that federal appellate courts rarely reverse awards of monetary sanctions if they
are reasonable).
213. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-28.
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a. careful "abuse" review
The courts of appeals interpreting the 1983 Rule articulated how
the standard was to work without always analyzing the consequences.
On the other hand, some courts were sensitive to the problem of over-
zealous use of sanctions by the district courts. The First Circuit has
stated that the court of appeals is not to act as a "iubber stamp" even
though an across-the-board abuse of discretion standard is to be ap-
plied.214 Similarly, one panel of the Seventh Circuit has written that
although appellate review is deferential, the court should give " 'care-
ful reference to the standards governing the exercise of the court's
discretion and to the purposes Rule 11 is meant to serve.' "215
When the district court imposes sanctions based on an erroneous
view of the law, some courts have held that Cooter & Gell does not
preclude reversal.216 One court, without citing Cooter & Gell, noted
that "[a] district court's decision whether a motion is legally sufficient
is a question of law and subject to de novo review." 217 Obviously the
court is technically incorrect.
As a practical matter, however, the Ninth Circuit's erroneous ap-
plication of law standard amounts to abuse of discretion when it re-
sults in a finding of a Rule 11 violation.21 8 This is a sensible approach.
Sanctions should not be permitted to stand when the basis for the
sanction is a district court judge's misapplication of the law. It would
be ironic indeed if the appellate court could reverse a grant of a mo-
tion to dismiss, for example, because the court misapplied the law, but
had to affirm sanctions for the filing of-according to the district
court-a frivolous complaint.
b. loose "abuse" review
Other cases demonstrate that appellate decision making is not
guided by a desire to cure the effects of aggressive district court ac-
tion. Indeed, consistent with the Supreme Court's position, most post-
Cooter & Gell opinions have emphasized the importance of the dis-
trict court in the sanctions process. For example, in Automatic Liquid
214. Media Duplication Servs., Ltd. v. HDG Software Inc., 928 F.2d 1228, 1238 (1st Cir.
1991).
215. Beverly Gravel, Inc. v. DiDomenico, 908 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 689 (7th Cir. 1990)).
216. See, e.g., Pierce v. E.R. Tripler & Co., 955 F.2d 820,831 (2d Cir. 1992); Townsend v.
Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990).
217. In re International Yacht & Tennis, Inc., 922 F.2d 659, 663 (11th Cir. 1991).
218. See VAmo, supra note 2, § 8.04[d][5][A], at 8-59.
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Packaging, Inc. v. Dominik, 19 the Seventh Circuit held that an appel-
late court must apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard in
reviewing the decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions; this standard ap-
plies even in cases in which the district court had no special familiarity
with the facts and evidence.22
There is little indication in the reported cases that Cooter & Gell
has had a dramatic impact on appellate dispositions. Courts are con-
tinuing to affirm the grant of sanctions,221 reverse the grant of sanc-
tions, 2  and affirm the denial of sanctions.m2 Yet, an analysis of a few
post-Cooter & Gell cases demonstrates the potential for harm from a
"chilling effect" perspective.
In two cases there were two-to-one splits as to whether sanctions
should have been imposed. In Mareno v. Rowe,'24 the majority af-
firmed the dismissal of the complaint but reversed the sanctions im-
posed against the plaintiff because the district court failed to take into
account the complexity of New York's long-arm jurisprudence. The
dissenting judge believed that under Cooter & Gell's deferential stan-
dard of review, the sanctions should have been affirmed.S
The majority approach is preferable. Especially in a case such as
Mareno, in which the Rule 11 problem stems from the legal basis of a
claim, the benefit of the doubt should go to the party asserting the
"close" issue. Cooter & Gell should not insulate a district court's deci-
sion to impose sanctions from effective review in close cases.226
219. 909 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1990).
220. Id. at 1004.
221. See Teamsters Local 760 v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 921 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1990).
222. See, e.g., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 923 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir.
1991); United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1990); Mareno v. Rowe,
910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
223. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, 931 F.2d 1295, 1310 (8th
Cir. 1991); Hughes v. City of Fort Collins, 926 F.2d 986, 990 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[WMhile we
believe the case is a close one, under the clear standard so recently articulated by the
Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion ... pursuant to Rule 11."); Nerman v. Alexander Grant & Co., 926
F.2d 717, 722 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[Te find an abuse ... we must find either that the district
court based its decision [in refusing to impose sanctions] on 'an erroneous view of the law
or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence."' (quoting NAACP Special Contribu-
tion Fund v. Atkins, 908 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1990))); Princess Fabrics, Inc. v. CHF, Inc.,
922 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1990).
224. 910 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
225. Id. at 1047-49 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); see also Molinaro, 923 F.2d at 743
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (identifying "several drawbacks inherent in a non-deferential
appellate review of a district court's Rule 11 determinations").
226. In cases in which the district court refuses to impose sanctions, the loose abuse
standard will be protective. For example, in Hughes v. City of Fort Collins, 926 F.2d 986
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c. when is the law unsettled?
These decisions are important because they relate to the extent to
which courts of appeals are likely to correct errors made by a district
court taking too narrow a view of whether a claim or position is well
grounded in law. For example, courts have taken divergent ap-
proaches to the question whether a claim has a legal basis if the law is
unsettled. Is it enough that the Supreme Court has not ruled squarely
on the issue?
Under the 1983 Rule the controlling issue was whether the circuit
in which the action was brought had ruled on the points in question.
DeSisto College Inc. v. Line' 7 illustrates this principle. That case
raised a question of legislative immunity for a city council. Counsel
relied on a First Circuit case and ignored Eleventh Circuit precedent.
The Eleventh Circuit was not pleased:
Counsel... insist[s] that the position he has taken through-
out is "warranted by existing law" of the First Circuit ....
...It is the rare law that does not exist somewhere;
usually completely novel theories of law arise in areas of re-
cent innovation or invention. Otherwise, the question is not
whether the law exists, but whether it pertains in the jurisdic-
tion in which the law is being asserted.'
The court said that counsel should compare the law of jurisdiction
A with the law of jurisdiction B. "[T]he lawyer would be required to
inform the court that she recognized that XYZ was not yet a cogniza-
ble action in B but that she believed that the law of B should be ex-
tended, modified, or reversed .... Only then would the lawyer have
satisfied her obligations under Rule 11." 29 Counsel has a duty to rec-
ognize the binding precedent of the Eleventh CircuitP 0 The 1993
Advisory Committee's Notes, however, suggest that so long as there is
(10th Cir. 1991), a 28 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the district court dismissed the complaint but
denied the defendants' motions for sanctions, stating that a good faith argument "might"
be made for a modification of existing law. Id. at 987-88. Despite its apparent belief that
the plaintiff had violated Rule 11, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of sanctions:
"[W]hile we believe the case is a close one, under the clear standard so recently articulated
by the Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., we cannot say that the district
court abused its discretion in refusing to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11." Id. at 990.
227. 888 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 952 (1990).
228. Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
229. Id.
230. The Seventh Circuit takes a similar approach. See TMF Tool Co. v. Muller, 913
F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1990).
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supporting law or a dissenting opinion in another jurisdiction, sanc-
tions should not be imposed.3
There is no question under the 1993 Rule that if no circuit law
exists, a litigant is free to make novel legal arguments. 32 Similarly,
under the 1993 Rule, dispositive law of another circuit should suffice
to show that a claim is not groundless. 33
Clearly, however, litigants who cite supportive case law from an-
other circuit, but ignore contrary dispositive case law of the home cir-
cuit, will still invite sanctions under the theory of a breach of the duty
of candor. But what is "dispositive"? A dissenting judge in Interna-
tional Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc.234 made a relevant point.
The case presented, a complete diversity issue: whether there is fed-
eral jurisdiction when there are aliens on both sides of a diversity case.
The Second Circuit ruled that under the law of the circuit it was clear
enough that there was no diversity and, therefore, the plaintiff's law-
yer should be sanctioned. The dissent disagreed on both scores:
If [R]ule 11 is to fulfill its purpose of deterring frivolous liti-
gation, it is critical that courts articulate clear, objective stan-
dards by which attorneys can reliably measure their conduct
and that we avoid the corrosive effect of arbitrary, seemingly
contradictory applications of the rule. Here, identical argu-
ments asserted in the same district were held in one case not
to violate Rule 11, but to "egregious[ly]" violate it in the
next; yet the same body of appellate and statutory law was
available to both courts. I fear the majority's ruling today
231. See 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-25.
232. See Aggregates (Carolina), Inc. v. Kruse, 134 F.R.D. 23, 27 (D.P.R. 1991).
Although [defendant's] papers leave little doubt that the attorney did no research
into the issue of whether Rule 41(a)(1)(i) may be employed against one defend-
ant in a case where other defendants have filed answers, the law is not as settled
as plaintiffs would have us believe. No Supreme Court or First Circuit case has
directly addressed the issue.
Id. at 26. The Kruse court concluded that since there was "enough of a shade of a technical
argument," no sanctions were warranted. Id. at 27.
233. For example, in Danese v. City of Roseville, 757 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Mich. 1991),
the defendant argued that the law of another circuit that would have been dispositive ren-
dered the plaintiff's claims frivolous. Id. at 829. The district court disagreed:
[S]uch law does not present binding authority in this Court or in the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Therefore, plaintiffs' failure to succumb to the dic-
tates of [Fifth Circuit case law] does not amount to an unreasonable practice.
Furthermore, even if [those cases] were sixth circuit cases .... plaintiffs were free
under Rule 11 to argue for an extension, modification, or reversal of [existing
law].
Id. at 830.
234. 875 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1990).
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may prove to be a step backward in the evolution of compre-
hensible and fair standards for applying Rule Mi3"
Thus, under the 1983 Rule it was possible to be sanctioned even if
there were a judge who agreed that an argument was meritorious or,
at least, not frivolous. 36 This observation points out the subjectivity
problem of Rule 11 and its potential for chilling the development of
the law. In some cases a sanctioned litigant or attorney will ultimately
succeed in reversing the sanctions imposed.P 7 In other cases the sanc-
tioned party will not only succeed in reversing the sanctions, but will
also prevail on the law.3 8
There is no way of knowing if district courts will heed the 1993
Advisory Committee's admonition to deny sanctiofis motions if there
is marginal support.3 9 Because the Advisory Committee's Notes to
the 1993 amendments stated that the standard of review will continue
to be abuse of discretion,214 it is questionable whether the law will
change in this area. On the other hand, courts are required to make
findings when sanctions are imposed but need not make findings when
235. Id. at 395 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
236. For example, in Danese the plaintiffs brought a civil rights action against city offi-
cials and employees. 757 F. Supp. at 828. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. On
appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed in a split decision. Id The defendants then moved to
recover actual costs and attorney fees. Id. The district court denied Rule 11 sanctions:
[P]laintiffs' conduct was within the parameters of acceptable professional con-
duct. As evidenced by plaintiffs' success in the district court and by the split deci-
sion in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs presented reasonable theories of recovery
in their complaint based on an adequate inquiry into relevant facts and sufficient
investigation of the relevant law.
Additionally, plaintiffs' contentions may have been warranted by a good-
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, as evi-
denced by the appellate court's split decision in favor of defendants.
Id. at 829-30. The court also noted that there was no evidence of bad faith or improper
motive. Id. at 830.
237. For example, in Alia v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1990), the
district court dismissed the complaint and imposed sanctions. Id. at 1100. lk4o judges
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Id. at 1108. One of those judges and the dissent-
ing judge reversed the sanctions. Id. The dissenting judge believed that the majority had
the law wrong and that the complaint should have been reinstated, as well as sanctions
reversed. Id. at 1103-08 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
238. In In re Edmonds, 924 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1991), a creditor filed a complaint to
revoke the debtor's discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 178. The debtor moved
to dismiss on laches and statute of limitations grounds. Id. at 179. The bankruptcy court
granted the motion and imposed Bankruptcy Rule 9011 sanctions. Id. The district court
affirmed. Id. The Tenth Circuit disagreed: "[I]n its pleadings before the bankruptcy court,
creditor advanced a colorable argument why the affirmative defense of laches and the one-
year statute of limitations should not bar its revocation." Id. at 181. The court of appeals
reinstated the complaint and reversed the sanctions. Id. at 182.
239. 1993 advisory committee's notes, supra note 83, at J-28.
240. Id.
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sanctions are not imposed.241 Thus, as a practical matter, it is likely
that the courts will move toward closer scrutiny in the former situation
and "loose abuse" in the latter.
3. No fees on fees
Finally, the Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell decided that it was
inappropriate to allow a successful Rule 11 movant to add to a com-
pensatory sanction costs and attorneys' fees for obtaining the sanc-
tions.242 This portion of Cooter & Gel! has been effectively replaced
by the new provision in amended Rule 11 which allows the court to
shift fees to the prevailing party on a Rule 11 motion.243
C. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises, Inc.
In the third Supreme-Court case, Business Guides, Inc. v. Chro-
matic Communications Enterprises, Inc. .2' the Court, again using its
literal approach to Rule 11, (1) applied the same objective standard to
represented parties as to attorneys;245 (2) held Rule 11 valid under the
Rules Enabling Act;246 and (3) adopted a test for determining which
papers were subject to Rule 11.247
1. Unrepresented parties are subject to the same standard as
attorneys
In Business Guides the Court rejected the argument that impos-
ing sanctions against a represented party that did not act in bad faith
violated the Rules Enabling Act.24 The petitioner argued that Rule
11 imposed an objective standard of reasonableness on represented
parties and thereby exceeded the limit of a court's power.2 49 Applying
its "plain meaning" approach to the interpretation of Rule 11, the
Court found that the Rule made no distinction between attorneys who
signed papers subject to Rule 11 and others who sign papers.250
241. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).
242. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 406-07 (1990).
243. FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c)(2).
244. 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
245. Id. at 550-51.
246. Id. at 551-53.
247. Id- at 543-46.
248. Id. at 551-53.
249. Id at 551.
250. Id. at 541-44. One problem is determining who will be sanctioned when an individ-
ual signs a paper on behalf of a legal entity. See VAIRO, supra note 2, § 10.04.
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The paper in issue in Business Guides was an affidavit signed by a
represented party in connection with a motion for a temporary re-
straining order 51 The Court found that "[t]he essence of Rule 11 is
that signing is no longer a meaningless act; it denotes merit. A signa-
ture sends a message to the district court that this document is to be
taken seriously." 2
Accordingly, the Court held that a district court may sanction a
represented party for signing a paper in violation of Rule 11.211 The
Court stated that "[a] contrary rule would establish a safe harbor such
that sanctions could not be imposed where an attorney, pressed to act
quickly, reasonably relies on a client's careless misrepresentations.
' '1 54
2. Is there a hierarchy of papers?
In Business Guides the Supreme Court adopted a broad test for
determining which "other papers" are subject to Rule 11; this test pre-
sumably survives the 1993 Rule.25- The debate between the majority
and the dissent on this issue suggests that there is a hierarchy of pa-
pers. The paper in issue was an affidavit that the represented party
signed in connection with a motion for a temporary restraining order
(TRO). 6 The Court's test was whether the litigant sought to invoke
the court's power. 57
Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent, recommended a narrower
test?.28 He "would construe the 'papers' covered by Rule 11 to be
those which, like pleadings or motions, invoke the power of the court,
as distinct from supporting affidavits alleging factual matters as in this
case or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56."- 9 Thus, the mo-
tion for a TRO itself, which typically would be signed by the attorney,
would be sanctionable, but the supporting affidavits, no matter who
signed them, would not be.
251. Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 536.
252. Id. at 546.
253. Id at 554.
254. Id at 550. Justice Kennedy dissented. He is probably correct that the Advisory
Committee did not intend to extend Rule 11 to represented parties who sign a paper. See
id. at 564-68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Clearly, the committee intended to make sure that
pro se litigants were covered by the amended Rule. The key purpose of the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11 was to provide an effective tool for disciplining lawyers who filed papers
without adequate investigation. Id. at 558.
255. See id. at 544-45.
256. Id at 558.
257. Id. at 544-46.
258. See id. at 554-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 562 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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While narrow constructions of Rule 11 are to be applauded, Jus-
tice Kennedy's proposal should not be. He mentioned the "warranted
by law" clause of Rule 11260 to support his construction, but neglected
to mention the "warranted by the facts" clause.261 Rule 11 seeks to
eliminate the, filing of papers that are not warranted by the facts or
law. Indeed, regarding the chilling effect of Rule -11, it is much less
likely that there will be a close call as to whether a colorable factual
statement or allegation-it either is or is not a fact-has been made,
than whether a colorable legal argument has been made.
Moreover, factually frivolous filings are more problematic than
legally frivolous filings.. Frivolous legal arguments can be addressed
with relative ease by motions either to dismiss for failure to state a
claim or for summary judgment.262 The law is in the library. When an
adversary claims to have the facts, however, and alleges them in an
affidavit or other paper, it is relatively difficult to dispose of the mat-
ter without resorting to extensive discovery or an expensive trial.263
Neither the parties nor their attorneys should be able to file support-
ing papers setting forth facts, purportedly on personal knowledge,
without risk of sanction.
Thus, the Business Guides opinion is likely to add fuel to an
emerging Rule 11 issue: Does Rule 11 apply equally to all types of
papers and all types of issues? This issue presents an important prob-
lem because there is no question that Rule 11 has been used aggres-
sively against plaintiffs, thereby creating the chilling effect problem. 64
In fact one court ruled that plaintiffs are subject to a heavier Rule 11
burden. In Stitt v. Williams265 the Ninth Circuit found that a com-
plaint should be judged more severely than a motion for summary
judgment. The court stated:
The differences between the filing of an opposition to a mo-
tion for summary judgment and the filing of a complaint pro-
vide a persuasive rationale for treating the two actions
differently for purposes of Rule 11. Although we have re-
260. Id. at 562 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (construing FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)).
261. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (construing FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3)-(4)).
262. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 56.
263. For a good example of this problem, see the troubled history of Pavelic & LeFlore
v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989). In Pavelic & LeFlore the plaintiff's
attorney filed a copyright infringement claim. Id at 121. Because the plaintiff continually
changed its factual theory, it was difficult for the court to dispose of the matter by pretrial
motion. See id. After an expensive trial, the district court finally imposed sanctions of
about $100,000. IaL at 122.
264. See supra part IILB.2.a-b.
265. 919 F.2d 516, 529 (9th Cir. 1990).
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cently held that frivolous claims cannot find a "safe harbor"
in a complaint merely because the complaint also contains
non-frivolous claims,... we need not be concerned about
safe harbors here. The frivolous part of an opposition to a
summary judgment motion does not in any way pose the
same type of threat to the moving party that a frivolous claim
in a complaint poses to an innocent defendant. Therefore, it
is appropriate to evaluate such opposition papers under a
different standard than we use for papers filed at the outset
of the litigation.266
The problem with this analysis is clear. In many cases the plain-
tiff may be unable to secure evidence on all elements of a claim until
after discovery has been taken, especially when the problem is the
factual basis of the claim. For example, in Kraemer v. Grant
County2 67 the Seventh Circuit discussed- the problems confronting
plaintiffs and noted that direct proof of-certain elements is difficult, if
not impossible, to obtain. 268 Thus, the court ruled that it could not
require an attorney to procure a confession of participation
in a conspiracy from one of the prospective defendants
before filing suit ....
... If discovery is necessary to establish a claim, then it
is not unreasonable to fie a complaint so as to obtain the
right to conduct that discovery. "Rule 11 must not bar the
courthouse door to people who have some support for a
complaint but need discovery to prove their case. 269
It is unlikely that the revisions will have much impact on this is-
sue. The 1993 amendments make it clear, however, that any paper or
oral assertion "presented to the court" will implicate Rule 11.270
Thus, the rule can be interpreted quite broadly.
D. Willy v. Coastal Corp.: Jurisdiction Revisited
The Court again took a tough approach to enforcement of Rule
11 in Willy v. Coastal Corp.271' The plaintiff filed a wrongful discharge
266. Id. (citation omitted).
267. 892 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1990).
268. Id. at 689.
269. Id. at 689-90 (quoting Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063,
1068 (7th Cir. 1987)).
270. 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 85, at J-11.
271. 112 S. Ct. 1076 (1992).
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action against his employer in state court.2 72 The employer removed
the case to the Southern District of Texas, arguing that the case
presented a federal question.273 The plaintiff unsuccessfully opposed
the removal.2 74 After denying the plaintiff's motion to remand, the
district court dismissed the plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim
and imposed over $22,000 in Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff
and his attorney? 75 The Rule 11 violation was based on the materials
that the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss, not
on the materials submitted on the motion to remand.276
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court on the removal ques-
tion, finding that no federal question or other basis for federal subject-
matter jurisdiction existed.277 Yet the court affirmed the Rule 11 sanc-
tion and remanded for reconsideration of the amount of the award.
278
On appeal from the remand, the plaintiff argued that because the
court decided that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction,
it also lacked jurisdiction to award sanctions for the papers submitted
on the motion to dismiss.279 Relying on Cooter & Gell,2 80 the Fifth
Circuit decided that the authority to impose sanctions rested in the
federal courts' inherent powers.28
The Supreme Court affirmed.' It rejected the argument that
Rule 11 impermissibly expanded the reach of federal jurisdiction be-
yond the limits of Article III of the Constitution if a court imposed
sanctions in a case in which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.283
The Court stated that Congress has the power to make all laws "nec-
essary and proper" 2 4 to establish the courts authorized by Article III
and to regulate the conduct of those courts.285 As for Rule 11, the
Court held that although lack of subject-matter jurisdiction precludes
further adjudication of a matter, a "final determination of lack of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction ... does not automatically wipe out all pro-








280. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
281. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 915 F.2d 965, 966-67 (5th Cir. 1990).
282. Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1081.
283. Id. at 1080.
284. Id (citing U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
285. Id.
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ceedings had in the district court at a time when the district court
operated under the misapprehension that it had jurisdiction.",
286
As in Cooter & Gel1287 the Court said that the sanctions question
is collateral to the merits. 88 Because the Rule 11 determination does
not "'signify a district court's assessment of the legal merits of the
complaint,' ,29 Rule 11 "does not raise the issue of a district court
adjudicating the merits of a 'case or controversy' over which it lacks
jurisdiction.
290
The Court concluded that "there is no constitutional infirmity
under Article III in requiring those practicing before the courts to
conduct themselves in compliance with the applicable procedural
rules in the interim, and to allow the courts to impose Rule 11 sanc-
tions in the event of their failure to do so.
' 291
Apart from its begging the question about whether there was a
case or controversy, the Supreme ' Court's decision in Willy is funda-
mentally unfair. The litigant sanctioned-in Willy was dragged into the
federal court, and ultimately correctly opposed the assertion of fed-
eral jurisdiction. 92 If the district court had not erred, the plaintiff
would not have been forced to defend the complaint. The opinion
shows again just how supportive the Supreme Court is likely to con-
tinue to be in affirming the aggressive use of Rule 11. Nevertheless,
under the proposed revisions, Willy would be sanctioned for "present-
ing" papers and making arguments in federal court that offended the
Rule's standards. Indeed, plaintiffs whose cases are removed can be
sanctioned the second they suggest that they will not dismiss the com-
plaint because they are in essence "presenting" by "later advocating"
the claim to the court.2 93
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the last ten years, federal practitioners and judges have
been quite preoccupied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
There have been several empirical studies,294 and some statistics gen-
286. Id.
287. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
288. Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1080.
289. Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 396).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1081.
292. See id at 1078.
293. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
294. See, e.g., AmERiCAN JUDICATURE Soc'y, RULE 11 IN TRANsITON: THE REPORT
OF THE THIRD CIRcUrr TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 56
November 1994]
84 LOYOLA'OP LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
,erated by this Author almost ten years ago may be part of the reason
why. 95 , These "statistics," expanded and incorporated into an article
about Rule 11,296 quickly became ammunition for critics of Rule 11.297
The statistics seemed to confirm that the Rule was being used dis-
proportionately against plaintiffs, especially in civil rights, employ-
ment discrimination, and other types of "disfavored" litigation. The
statistics also showed that Rule 11 had become a "cottage industry"
and was counterproductively producing more litigation rather than
streamlining current litigation proceedings.2 98 Professor Stephen
Burbank, the reporter for the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 'criticized this Author's survey of pub-
lished Rule 11 cases as "highly problematic. '299 In any event the
more carefully planned and "statistically correct" studies conducted
since this Author's frantic hand count generally confirmed its prelimi-
nary findings.3° Indeed thekey trends reported by the Third Circuit
Task Force and the Federal Judicial Center in 1988 are comparable to
those identified by.this Author's study.30' In addition, the most recent
statistical analysis of Rule 11 also confirms most of this Author's
findings.3 °2
,(1989) [hereinafter THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE REPORT]; THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 67-81 (1988) [hereinafter
FJC STUDY].
295. See Tamar Lewin, A Legal Curb Raises Hackles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1986, at D1.
296. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis,' 118 F.R.D. 189, 199-203
(1988).
297. See, e.g., Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313 (1986).
298. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 294, at 60.
299. Id. at 56.
300. See id.; Marshall et al., supra note 75, at 945.
301. Although this Author's statistics, based on reported cases, are more dramatic, the
trends identified by the other two surveys were remarkably similar. See THIRD CIRcurr
TAsK' FORCE REPORT, supra note 294, at 57-58; FJC STUDY, supra note 294, at 75.
302. See Marshall et al., supra note 75, at 945.
As we expected, our findings support many widely held intuitions about the use
and impact of the Rule while at the same time rebutting some other aspects of
conventional Rule 11 wisdom. Fr example, the study reveals that Rule 11 is
having a pervasive impact on lawyers' practice, particularly in prompting lawyers
to engage in increased pre-filing review of factual matters. The study also con-
firms the widespread belief that plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers have been the
target of sanctions and sanction activity far more frequently than defendants and
their attorneys. Interestingly, though, when plaintiffs' and defense lawyers were
asked to repqrt the effects Rule 11 has had on their practices, they reported
rather similar effects. Only in the area of civil rights did the results clearly differ
by side represented. In that category, plaintiffs' lawyers' behavior was affected
much more than their opponents' conduct. As for the sanctions themselves, we
found that non-nronetary sanctions are even more rare than has been believed,
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The statistical picture that has emerged since Rule 11 was
amended is an interesting one. The data strongly suggest that Rule
11's impact has been far greater than the 1983 Advisory Committee
predicted. Unfortunately, statistical studies do not help develop crite-
ria for determining whether Rule 11 is worth its costs. The Rule 11
debate implicates fundamental tenets of the federal system of civil
procedure and asks whether we can afford notice pleading and a lib-
eral discovery system that stacks the deck in favor of plaintiffs. Thus,
the Rule 11 dilemma cannot be resolved until the Advisory Commit-
tee meets that issue head on and examines our whole system of rules,
rather than using Rule 11 as a quick fix for all the system's perceived
ills.
Indeed, drastic changes in the judicial climate over the last ten
years parallel the issues that Rule 11 raises. The most important
change is that the Supreme Court has been using summary judgment
and doctrines such as standing and abstention to guard the federal
courthouse door ever more zealously. 3  The Court's implementation
of Rule 11 can be viewed as part of this trend to limit access to the
federal courts. Unfortunately, even though the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11 provide a "safe harbor," there is a serious question whether it
will protect litigants like Linda Brown, or their lawyers-whether
they be Julius Chambers, Thurgood Marshall, or a solo practitioner.
When a client and a lawyer believe in the merits of a case in good
faith, all the safe harbor will do is push back the day of reckoning.
The new standard for interpreting the viability of legal positions
will not provide much comfort. The switch from "good faith argu-
ment" to "nonfrivolous argument" is not likely to provide a more
helpful standard. Courts will still "know it when they see it" or em-
ploy the Seventh Circuit's highly sophisticated "wacky" standard." a
There is concern that the new concepts introduced will result in
another wave of litigation to clarify the Rule's meaning. However, the
revisions and the 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes are a clear and
although the amount of monetary sanctions seems to be substantially less than
many assume.
Id.
303. See Georgene M. Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary Judgment and the Trilogy,
in 3 TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL PRACTICE, AND EFFECrIVE LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FED-
ERAL AND STATE COURTS 1557, 1560 (ALI-ABA 1991); Georgene M. Vairo, Making
Younger Civi" The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings,
58 FORDHAM L. REv. 173, 173-76 (1989).
304. See Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1987)
(declaring that plaintiff's proffered theory of due process was "wacky, sanctionably so").
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emphatic signal that the abuses engendered by the 1983 version of the
Rule should be stopped.
Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether district courts and litigants
will heed the signal and exercise greater restraint by moving for and
imposing sanctions only in clear cases of Rule 11 violations. It may
be, for example, that too many district courts will routinely find, with
scanty justification, that huge fee awards are necessary to achieve the
deterrent purpose of the Rule. Courts of appeals may routinely affirm
under the abuse of discretion standard rather than require detailed
descriptions of the Rule 11 violation and careful explanations of the
sanction imposed.
Nonetheless, on balance the 1993 amendments are a positive step
forward. As Judge Robert E. Keeton, Chairperson of the Standing
Committee, put it: "'It is a significant change.... Rule 11 problems
are serious .... Something needs to be done.' "305 As Judge Keeton
also pointed out, however, "'no solution will achieve consensus.' "306
Indeed, although a majority of the Supreme Court approved the
amendments to Rule 11 in April 1993,30 Justices Scalia and Thomas
registered a vigorous dissent:
The proposed revision would render the Rule toothless, by
allowing judges to dispense with sanction, by disfavoring
compensation for litigation expenses, and by providing a 21-
day "safe-harbor" within which, if the party accused of a friv-
olous filing withdraws the filing, he is entitled to escape with
no sanction at all.30
8
As demonstrated by the Supreme Court cases discussed above,
the Court's Rule 11 decisions reveal two complementary interpretive
approaches: (1) reading the Rule literally; and (2) applying the Rule
strictly to combat perceived abuses in federal civil litigation. It re-
mains to be seen whether the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts, under the prompting of Justices Scalia and Thomas, will con-
tinue to take a relatively strict approach to the interpretation of Rule
11 or whether the Court will continue to adhere to its literal approach.
305. Randall Samborn, Key Panel Votes Shift in Rule 11, NAT'L L., July 6, 1992, at 13
(quoting Hon. Robert E. Keeton).
306. Id. (quoting Hon. Robert E. Keeton).
307. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 401, 405 (1993).
308. Dissenting statement of Justices Scalia and Thomas, Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 507, 507-08 (1993).
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Given the new language and purpose of the revisions, the latter ap-
proach would have a less draconian effect.
30 9
This Author suspects that the Rule 11 battle will go on precisely
because, as Judge Schwarzer predicts, we are seeing the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure being used to regulate attorney conduct.310 As dis-
cussed at the outset of this Article, we must question the extent to
which this apparently benign trend will go too far and undermine the
independence of the legal profession and our adversarial system of
civil justice-a system that has advanced the law in so many important
ways.
309. To date it is too soon to tell how the lower courts will approach the interpretation
of Rule 11. Some courts have noted the "liberalizing" effect of the new rule. See, e.g.,
Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 845 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Asllani v.
Board of Educ. of Chicago, 150 F.R.D. 120, 121 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
310. See Schwarzer, supra note 10, at 12-13.
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